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The large differences in hours of work across industrialized countries reflect large differences in
both employment to population ratios and hours per worker. We imbed the canonical model of labor
supply into a standard matching model to produce a model in which both the intensive and extensive
margins are operative. We then assess the implications of several policies for changes along the two
margins. Firing taxes and entry barriers both lead to changes in hours and employment in opposite
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Hours of market work per person of working age exhibit dramatic diﬀerences
across industrialized countries. For example, hours worked in continental Euro-
pean economies such as Belgium, France, Germany and Italy are roughly one third
less than in the US. A growing literature seeks to understand the relative impor-
tance of the various factors that have been proposed as candidate explanations:
tax and transfer programs, labor market regulations (e.g., employment protection
and minimum wages), unions, preferences, and product market regulations (e.g.,
entry barriers).1 Although one must ultimately carry out a quantitative assess-
ment of a particular factor in order to argue that it is empirically relevant, when
one is at the stage of contrasting alternative explanations, it is often useful at a
qualitative level to note any diﬀering implications across candidate explanations
as a way to discriminate between them. A notable feature of the data is that dif-
ferences in aggregate hours are due to quantitatively important diﬀerences along
both the extensive margin (employment to population ratio) and the intensive
margin (annual hours worked per worker in employment). Despite this, existing
analyses have typically abstracted from modeling both margins. In this paper
we argue that examining the implications of policies and institutions for diﬀer-
ences in hours worked along these two margins can serve as a way to qualitatively
distinguish between various explanations.
To pursue this, we develop a model that includes both extensive and intensive
1Recent contributions that argue in favor of particular factors include Prescott (2004) for
taxes, Alesina et al (2005) for unions and labor market regulation, Fonseca et al (2003) for entry
costs, and Blanchard (2004) for preferences.
1margins by embedding a canonical model of labor supply into an otherwise stan-
dard Pissarides matching model. The former provides a theory of choice along the
intensive margin, while the latter provides a theory of choice along the extensive
margin. Although the preferences of workers in our model imply that workers
would prefer to all be employed and work the same hours, matching frictions
generate a nonconvexity, and this nonconvexity gives rise to interior solutions for
both margins of labor supply. We provide a simple diagrammatic representation
of steady-state equilibrium in our model and then use it to derive analytic results
regarding the eﬀects of several policies on the steady-state levels of hours and
employment. Our analysis is perhaps of independent interest in that it can be
interpreted as extending the Pissarides model to allow for strictly concave util-
ity and endogenous choice of hours.2 While the model is simple, we believe that
it serves as a useful benchmark for assessing the eﬀects of various labor market
policies.
Allowing for both intensive and extensive margins turns out to have signiﬁ-
cant implications for the relative eﬀects of various policies. Speciﬁcally, policies
that have similar qualitative eﬀects on aggregate employment in the standard Pis-
sarides model when only the extensive margin is modeled, turn out to have very
diﬀerent eﬀe c t so nh o u r sp e rw o r k e ri no u rm o d e l . F o re x a m p l e ,w eﬁnd that
while increases in either ﬁring taxes or entry barriers can lead to reductions in
employment, these policies necessarily lead to increases in hours worked along the
intensive margin. In contrast, increases in labor income taxes that are used to
2Endogenizing the choice of hours in a model with linear utility is a simple extension of the
standard Pissarides model. See, e.g., the survey paper of Rogerson et al (2005).
2fund a lump-sum transfer lead to decreases in both employment and hours per
worker. Policies that limit the length of the workweek necessarily lead to increases
in employment. In the context of the model that we analyze, we conclude that it
is less likely that entry barriers, ﬁring taxes or exogenous workweek restrictions
are the dominant source of diﬀerences in aggregate hours of work. More generally,
we conclude that requiring any proposed theory of diﬀerences in aggregate hours
of work to also confront the diﬀerences along the intensive and extensive margins
is likely to be informative.
Although our results are obtained in the context of one particular model,
we believe that the economic forces captured by our model are likely to apply
much more broadly. The reason for this is that our model captures a very simple
economic reality: from the perspective of producing output, the intensive and
extensive margins are substitutes. Any policy that acts directly on one of these
m a r g i n si sl i k e l yt ol e a dt oa d j u s t m e n t sa l o n gt h et w om a r g i n si no p p o s i t ed i r e c -
tions. For example, ﬁring costs and entry barriers have a direct eﬀect of making
it more costly to use the extensive margin, and as a result lead to opposing eﬀects
on the intensive margin. Taxes, on the other hand, directly impact both margins,
and hence lead to changes along both margins that are in the same direction.
The exercise that we carry out in this paper should be seen as an illustration of
a much broader line of research. Even if our main goal is to understand the diﬀer-
ences in certain aggregate variables across countries, it will typically be the case
that disaggregated data will help to distinguish between competing mechanisms
that can ﬁt with the aggregate data. In the context of diﬀerences in aggregate
3hours of work, empirical work shows that there are some striking patterns at
various levels of disaggregation.3 Decomposing diﬀerences in hours worked into
diﬀerences along the intensive and extensive margins is just one example of this
broader point.
An outline of the paper follows. In the next section we document diﬀerences in
hours worked between the US and several European countries and show how these
diﬀerences can be decomposed into diﬀerences along the extensive and intensive
margins. Section 3 presents the model, and Section 4 presents a characterization
of the steady state equilibrium. In Section 5 we use the model to deduce the eﬀects
of several policies on steady state employment and hours per worker. Section 6
concludes.
2. Data
Although the analysis of this paper will be qualitative in nature, it is important
to at least brieﬂy present some of the evidence that serves to motivate the current
analysis. on diﬀerences in hours worked across countries and the decomposition of
these diﬀerences along extensive and intensive margins. Data on aggregate civilian
employment relative to the size of the population aged 15-64 is taken from the
OECD, while data on annual hours of work per person in employment is taken
from the GGDC. The product of these two values provides a measure of market
work per person of working age that can be compared across countries. Table 1
3Rogerson (2006) describes some of these diﬀerences. For example, he shows that diﬀerences
in hours worked are dominated by diﬀerences in hours in the service sector, and that diﬀerences
are much larger for younger and older workers than for prime aged workers.
4presents data on these measures for the year 2003 for four European economies
relative to the US.
Table 1
Market Work in Europe Relative to the US (2003)
Belgium France Germany Italy Average
Hours per Person .71 .68 .73 .69 .70
Employment/Population .83 .88 .91 .79 .85
Hours per Employed Person .86 .77 .80 .87 .83
The four economies that appear in this table are of particular interest since
among OECD countries they exhibit the largest diﬀerences in hours worked rela-
t i v et ot h eU S .I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a td i ﬀerences in annual hours per person
in employment reﬂects several factors, such as diﬀerences in the workweek for full
time workers, the composition of full and part-time work, as well as diﬀerences in
statutory holidays and vacation days. The model that we develop in the next sec-
tion is aimed at understanding diﬀerences in hours for full time employees rather
than the choice of part-time versus full time employment. France and Germany
exhibit greater part-time employment than the US, so that part of the hours per
employed person gap in this case is accounted for by the composition of full-time
and part-time. In Italy, part-time work is less frequent than in the US. Alesina
et al (2005) document that a large part of the diﬀerences in hours per employed
person is due to diﬀe r e n c e si ns t a t u t o r yh o l i d a y sa n dv a c a t i o nd a y sf o rf u l lt i m e
workers. While there is some variation across these four countries, the key pattern
that we wish to emphasize is that the very large diﬀerences in hours of work per
5person of working age are due to large diﬀerences in both employment to popula-
tion ratios as well as annual hours of work per person in employment. On average,
diﬀerences in employment and hours per worker are of roughly equal importance
in accounting for diﬀerences in total work between these countries and the US.
3. Model
The model is best characterized as embedding the canonical model of labor sup-
p l yi n t oas i m p l eP i s s a r i d e sm a t c h i n gm o d e la l o n gt w od i m e n s i o n s . S p e c i ﬁcally,
relative to the Pissarides model, we assume preferences are strictly concave in
consumption and that employed workers make a decision about how many hours
to work. The details of the environment follow.
3.1. Environment
There is a continuum of mass one of households. In order to avoid the issue of
risk-sharing across households, we follow Merz (1994) and Andolfatto (1996) in
assuming that each household in turn consists of a continuum of mass one of
members. This assumption implies that households will not face any uncertainty.
Each individual has preferences deﬁned over consumption (ct) and hours of work





where u : R+ → R is increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
concave, g :[ 0 ,1] → R is increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
6convex. The function g represents the disutility of working, and we assume that
each individual has a time endowment of one in each period. To guarantee interior










A household seeks to maximize the average utility of its members.
The unit of production is a matched worker-job pair. Output from a matched
pair is given by the function f(h) w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tf is increasing, twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, weakly concave and satisﬁes f(0) = 0.A n yj o b - w o r k e r
match that produces in period t faces a probability λ of becoming unproductive
at the end of the period, i.e., output will be zero independently of h .T h es t a t eo f
being unproductive is an absorbing state. Realizations of this shock are iid across
all producing matches.
The process by which unemployed workers (u) and vacant jobs (v)c o m ei n t o
contact with each other is speciﬁe db yam a t c h i n gf u n c t i o nm(u,v) that gives
the number of matches that result from the given inputs into the search process.
This function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, weakly concave in
both arguments jointly, strictly concave in each argument individually, exhibit
constant returns to scale and to have the property that m(u,v) ≤ min{u,v}.
As is standard, we assume that search for unemployed workers is costless, that
employed workers are not allowed to search, but that it is costly for jobs to ﬁnd
workers. Qualitatively, it does not matter if this cost is modelled as a one time
cost that is paid in order to create a vacant job, or as a ﬂow cost associated
7with the process of searching for a worker. When we analyze the eﬀects of entry
barriers it will be convenient to have the cost modelled as an up front cost rather
than a ﬂow cost, so for simplicity we assume that there is a one time ﬁxed cost κ,
measured in units of output, in order to create an unﬁlled job. Given this ﬁxed
cost, the standard posting cost serves no important additional purpose, and so we
set it equal to zero for simplicity. There is no limit to the number of jobs that
can be created, and all created jobs are identical.
3.2. Equilibrium
Although the ingredients speciﬁed in the previous section are suﬃcient to deﬁne
the set of feasible allocations and formulate a social planner’s problem for the
economy, in order to formulate our notion of decentralized equilibrium we will
have to specify some additional aspects. As is standard in the literature, we
will assume that wages are determined via generalized Nash bargaining between
individual workers and their ﬁrms. We denote the bargaining weight of the worker
by θ. The outside option of the worker is unemployment, while the outside option
of the ﬁrm is an unﬁlled job. When bargaining, each worker-ﬁrm pair takes the
outcomes in the rest of the economy as given. This implies that each individual
worker bargains as if they are the marginal member of the household.
Firms in this model do not engage in consumption. Rather, in the spirit of
modern general equilibrium theory, ﬁrms are simply economic agents that have
access to technology and seek to maximize proﬁts. We assume that the ownership
of all ﬁrms is equally distributed among households. In equilibrium each ﬁrm
8takes the actions of all other ﬁrms as given when making its decisions. The
theory laid out places no restrictions on how jobs will be distributed across ﬁrms
in equilibrium, and so without loss of generality we normalize the number of ﬁrms
to one.
It is well known that in matching models with linear utility it is equally easy
to characterize both the steady state equilibrium and the dynamics out of steady
state. This is no longer the case once one allows for strictly concave utility, since
the interest rate is no longer constant outside of steady state. As a result, our
analysis here will focus entirely on the steady state equilibrium.
We normalize the price of output to bee q u a lt oo n e . T h er e m a i n i n gv a l u e s
that characterize a steady state equilibrium are c (consumption per individual),
h (hours worked per matched worker), e (fraction of workers employed in each
household) w (the payment from ﬁrms to workers), v (vacancies posted), u (num-
ber of unemployed workers), and π (total proﬁts of the ﬁrm). Note that given
u and v we can determine p = m(u,v)/u (meeting rate for unemployed workers)
and q = m(u,v)/v (the meeting rate for unﬁlled jobs).
A steady state equilibrium is values for these variables such that:
(1) w and h are consistent with Nash bargaining
(2) the household budget constraint holds: c = we+ π.
(3) proﬁts satisfy: π = e(f(h) − w) − κλe.
(4) the return to creating an unﬁlled job is equal to zero.
(5) the level of employment is constant: λe = m(u,v).
(6) feasibility: c = ef(h) −κλe.
94. Characterizing Steady-State Equilibrium
In this section we show how to characterize the steady-state equilibrium. In
the version of our model with linear utility one can reduce the conditions that
characterize equilibrium to a single equation that determines the ratio v/u,a n d
all other values can be determined given this value. With strictly concave utility
we show that the conditions that characterize equilibrium can be reduced to a set
of two equations in the values v/u and h, with all other values determined from
these two values.
In order to solve the bargaining problem it is necessary to derive value functions
for the household and the ﬁrm. The state variable for the household is e,t h e
fraction of its members that are employed, and we denote the value function for
the household in the steady state by V (e). Denoting steady state values with











The value of individual jobs to the ﬁrm are independent of how many jobs the
ﬁrm has, so the key values are simply the value of a ﬁlled job and the value of
an unﬁlled job, which we denote by Je and Ju respectively. In steady state these
values satisfy:
J




e +( 1− q)J
u] (4.3)
10where we have made use of the fact that in steady state the interest rate satisﬁes
1/(1+r)=β. We have also implicitly assumed that an unﬁlled job will necessarily
post a vacancy. This will be true in any equilibrium with positive employment,
which is the case of interest.




1 − β(1 − λ)
. (4.4)
Also, in equilibrium the ﬁrm will create new unﬁlled vacancies as long as it is
proﬁtable, implying that in equilibrium it must be that Ju = κ.
We can now characterize the determination of equilibrium values for w and h.
In steady state, the solution to the bargaining problem is to choose current values
of w and h so as to maximize:
θlog(V
0(e)) + (1 − θ)log(J
e − J
u),
taking as given that the bargains of all other household members in the current
period are given by the steady state values, and that all future bargains will also
be given by the steady state values. Note that with a continuum of members
within a household, the diﬀerence for the household between having the worker
employed and the threat point of having the worker unemployed is simply V 0(e).
Assuming interior solutions, the ﬁrst order conditions for the current period values
















Je − Ju =0 (4.6)
Recalling that future values are being held constant when bargaining over current



















Using these values to substitute into equations (4.5) and (4.6) and rearranging






θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p))(f(h) − (1 − β(1 − λ))κ)+( 1− θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))
g(h)
u0(c)
1 − β(1 − λ)+βpθ
(4.11)
The ﬁrst expression is the standard result that with Nash bargaining, hours will
be set eﬃciently.
As is standard, given an expression for w and the expressions for the ﬁrm’s
12value functions, the free entry condition Ju = κ can be rewritten as:
0=βq(1 − θ)(f(h) −
g(h)
u0(c)
) − ((1 − β)θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p))
+(1 − θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − β(1 − q)))κ (4.12)
Feasibility requires that:
c = ef(h) − λeκ, (4.13)
but making use of the fact that in steady state we have e = p/(p+λ),a n dqv = λe,




[f(h) − λκ] (4.14)
The equations (4.10), (4.12), (4.14) represent a system of three equations in
the three unknowns h, v/u,a n dc, and serve to characterize the steady state
equilibrium. It is instructive to consider some special cases of the model. In the
simplest Pissarides model, u is linear (i.e., u0 is a constant) and h is exogenous, so
equation (4.12) reduces to an equation in the single variable v/u. Given a solution
for v/u, one can use equation (4.14) to solve for c. If one maintains linear utility
b u tm a k e st h ev a l u eo fh endogenous, then equation (4.10) can be used to solve for
t h ee q u i l i b r i u mv a l u eo fh independently of the values for v/u and c. Substituting
this value into equation (4.12) we again have an equation in the single unknown
v/u. Given the implied solutions for h and v/u, we can again solve for c from
13equation (4.14).
In the general case where u is not linear, the value of c does not drop out
of equation (4.10), and the system of equations cannot be solved one at a time,
so one must deal with a system of three equations in three unknowns. Although
all of our results can be derived analytically by examining this system of three
equations in three unknowns, given that equation (4.14) expresses c in terms of
the other two variables, we can use it to substitute into the other two equations,
thereby reducing the problem to a system of two equations in the two unknowns
h and v/u. The resulting system permits a simple diagrammatic representation
of the equilibrium outcomes. Each of these equations describes a locus of points
in h − v/u space. As shown in the appendix, some algebra reveals that both of
these curves are downward sloping. Noting that in steady state, e is an increasing
function of v/u, these two expressions both reﬂect the fact that in this model
there is a fundamental trade oﬀ between e and h. From the household perspective,
holding all else constant, higher e implies higher c, thereby decreasing the eﬃcient
level of h. It follows that equation (4.10) depicts a downward sloping relationship
in h − v/u space. We will refer to this as the optimal hours curve. From the
ﬁrm perspective, a higher value of h holding all else constant leads to a higher
equilibrium value of w and lower proﬁt ﬂow from a ﬁlled job, thereby leading to
less incentive for job creation and lower steady state employment. This intuition
lies behind the fact that equation (4.12) depicts a downward sloping curve in
h − v/u space. We refer to this curve as the free entry curve.
Given that the steady-state equilibrium is represented as the intersection of
14two downward sloping curves, there is the obvious possibility that there may be
multiple intersections. We show in the appendix however, that at any point of
i n t e r s e c t i o n ,t h ef r e ee n t r yc u r v ei ss t e e p e rt h a nt h ee ﬃcient hours curve, implying
that there is at most one steady state. Figure 1 shows the graphical determination
of equilibrium in the model.














Figure 1: Determination of Steady-State Equilibrium
By way of comparison, we note that if we had assumed u were linear, then the
optimal hours curve in Figure 1 becomes horizontal.
5. Policy Analysis
In this section we consider the eﬀect of policies on the steady-state equilibrium,
with particular focus on what these policies imply for relative changes in steady
15state hours per worker and employment. While the simplicity of the model limits
the richness of the policies that can be analyzed, there are four policies which are
of general interest that can be addressed within our framework: a proportional
tax on labor income that funds a lump-sum transfer, a product market regulation
that increases the ﬁxed cost associated with job creation, and a labor market
regulation that imposes a ﬁring tax on ﬁrms whenever an employment position is
destroyed.
We begin by describing in more detail the policies that we analyze. The tax-
transfer program is characterized by a proportional tax τ on all labor earnings,
and a lump-sum transfer T that is determined via a balanced budget constraint
on the government. We model product market regulation in two diﬀerent ways.
The ﬁrst approach assumes that regulation takes the form of an entry barrier that
represents a cost κr, measured in units of output, that must be incurred when
creating a job. Solving for the eﬀects of this policy amounts to a comparative
s t a t i c se x e r c i s ei nw h i c ht h ev a l u eo fκ is increased from κ to κ+κr.4 The second
approach assumes that regulation takes the form of a per period cost κr that each
producing match must pay. This amounts to changing the production function
to f(h) − κr. Finally, we model employment protection as a cost φ,m e a s u r e d
in units of output, that the ﬁrm must pay whenever a match is destroyed.5 In
this model, matches are destroyed whenever the idiosyncratic shock that hits with
4Many recent empirical studies have documented diﬀerences in entry barriers across countries
and/or sought to assess their consequences for either employment or unemployment. See for
example, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), Djankov et al (2002)
Boeri et al (2000), Lopez-Garcia (2003), Messina (2006), and Fang and Rogerson (2007).
5Earlier studies of ﬁring costs include Bentolila and Bertola (1991) and Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993).
16probability λ occurs, so this policy amounts to the ﬁrm incurring a cost of φ in
terms of output whenever this shock is realized. For the case of product and labor
market regulations we will consider two cases, one in which the costs associated
with the regulation are used to fund a lump-sum transfer, and one in which these
costs are assumed to represent lost resources for the economy.
The next proposition summarizes the results of the policy analysis for the case
of lump-sum transfers.
Proposition 1: Assume that the proceeds from labor market regulation and
product market regulation are rebated lump-sum to households. Then (i) An in-
crease in τ leads to a decrease in both e and h. (ii) An increase in κr corresponding
to either type of regulation leads to a decrease in e and an increase in h. (iii) An
increase in φ leads to a decrease in e a n da ni n c r e a s ei nh.
The analytic proof is contained in the appendix. Here we discuss the results
i nt e r m so fF i g u r e1 .I ti se a s yt os e et h a tf o rt h ec a s e so fκr and φ,t h ee ﬃcient
hours curve does not shift. One can also show that the free entry curve shifts
downward. In both cases the policy change leads to lower employment and higher
hours of work. These results are intuitive. Both types of regulations make it
more costly to produce output by increasing hours along the employment margin,
and therefore encourage a substitution of h for e in production. For the case of
taxes, one can show that both curves in Figure 1 shift downward. Based on the
diagrammatic analysis, this suggests that the eﬀects are ambiguous, but in the
appendix we show that the eﬀects can be signed and are both negative.
The above result assumed that the costs associated with regulation were re-
17bated lump-sum to households. In many cases these costs might better be thought
of as representing real resource costs to the economy that are lost, in which case
they would not be rebated. In this case the eﬀects on h are as above, but the
eﬀects on e are ambiguous because of opposing income and substitution eﬀects.
Proposition 2: Assume that the proceeds from labor market regulation and
product market regulation are not rebated to households. Then (i) An increase in
κr leads to an increase in h (ii) An increase in φ l e a d st oa ni n c r e a s ei nh.C h a n g e s
in e are ambiguous in both cases.
Our model also has a simple prediction regarding the implications of a policy
that exogenously limits hours per worker. In this case the condition that charac-
terizes eﬃcient choice of working hours is dropped and the equilibrium is described
by the downward sloping curve that depicts the free entry condition. It follows
that such a policy will necessarily lead to an increase in employment. While this
result is not surprising, we think it is important to note that such a policy does
imply opposing movements along the two margins.
Lastly, our model has implications for the eﬀect of a change in the bargaining
parameter θ. Some researchers have used this comparative static exercise as a way
to capture the eﬀects of diﬀerences in union bargaining strength. In our model it is
easy to show that holding h constant, an increase in θ leads to lower v/u,t h e r e b y
implying both lower employment and lower consumption. But lower consumption
implies a higher value of h via the ﬁrst order condition for hours. It necessarily
follows that employment decreases and hours increases.
186. Conclusion
The analysis of this paper suggests that explicit modeling of the intensive and
extensive margins can provide very valuable additional information beyond that
which is contained in a model with only one margin. In the speciﬁcc o n t e x t
considered here, our work shows that such a model can play a role in qualitatively
distinguishing between the impacts of various factors that have been proposed
as candidates for accounting for the large diﬀerences in hours of work across
economies. For example, for each of the variations that we have considered, higher
levels of labor and product market regulations both lead to higher values for hours
worked along the intensive margin. We conclude from this analysis that if the
case is to be made for either product or labor market regulations as the dominant
sources of diﬀerences in total hours worked across countries, then these policies
must exert their inﬂuences through mechanisms other than those captured in
the benchmark model that we have studied. Development of these alternative
mechanisms is an important task.
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22Appendix
Derivation of Diagrammatic Representation













[(1 − β)θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p)) + (1 − θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − β(1 − q))]κ
Note that both p and q are implicitly functions of δ,a n dc is implicitly a function















[f(h) − λκ] > 0
23Note that the term in square brackets in the expression for cδ is necessarily positive
in any equilibrium with positive employment. Straightforward calculations allows























(1 − θ)[f(h) −
g(h)
u0(c)













We note that the term B1
δ can be signed as negative because the ﬁrst term in
square brackets [f(h)−
g(h)
u0(c) −(1−β(1−λ))κ] represents the implicit ﬂow surplus
measured in units of output taking into account the job creation cost and must





Bδ < 0, it follows that each expression depicts a negatively sloped curve in
h − δ space.
Proof of Unique Intersection
Noting that AδBh = A2
hB2
δ,w eh a v e



















Bδ. It follows that the optimal hours curve
is always ﬂatter than the free entry curve, implying that there is at most one
intersection.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s1 and 2
(i) Proportional income tax
Repeating the earlier analysis, and letting δ = v






0(h) − (1 − τ)u
0(c(h,δ))f
0(h)




−[(1 − β)θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p)) + (1 − θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − β(1 − q))]κ
and c(h,δ)=
p
p+λ[f(h) − λκ]. Note that taxes do not enter the expression for c
since the revenues are rebated. As before, ch > 0 and cδ > 0.
The following partial derivatives will be useful in the comparative statics re-
sults:
25Ah = g















Bh = βq(1 − θ)
g(h)u00(c)ch




(1 − θ)[f(h) −
g(h)
(1 − τ)u0(c)


















u0(c)(1 − τ)2 < 0
Note that B1
δ c a na g a i nb es i g n e da sn e g a t i v ei ft h ee x p e c t e dﬂow surplus from
a match expressed in units of output is positive. Standard analysis implies that











Noting that AδBh = A2
hB2
δ, AτB2
δ = AδBτ and A2
hBτ = BhAτ,w eh a v e :



















δ) − AδBτ = AτB
1
δ < 0




h)Bτ − BhAτ = A
1
hBτ < 0
It follows that ∂h




(ii) Entry cost κ Without Rebating
This case is the same as the benchmark case with a higher κ. Thus, equilibrium
conditions are the same. Proceeding as before, let δ = v










−[(1 − β)θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p)) + (1 − θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − β(1 − q))]κ





27The partials of A and B with regard to h and δ are exactly as before. The


































κ = BhAκ,w et h e nh a v e :




































κ) − BhAκ = AhB
1






κ | {z }
>0
It follows that ∂h
∂κ > 0 and that
∂ v
u
∂κ cannot be determined.
(iii) Entry Cost With Rebate
28We now consider the case in which the entry cost is increased to κ+κr,w h e r e
κr i st h ea d d i t i o n a le n t r yc o s td u et oe n t r yr e g u l a t i o n .T h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o n
changes to Ju = κ + κr. Feasibility requires:
c = ef(h) − λeκ
because the entry costs associated with κr are rebated back to consumers. Re-









−[(1 − β)θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p)) + (1 − θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − β(1 − q))](κ + κr)
where c is given by c =
p
p+λ[f(h) − λκ], since the proceeds associated with κr are
rebated.























(1 − θ)[f(h) −
g(h)
u0(c)














Bκr = −[(1 − β)θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p)) + (1 − θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − β(1 − q))] < 0











30Noting that AδBh = A2
hB2
δ,w eo b t a i n :
















AκrBδ − AδBκr = −AδBκr > 0
AhBκr − BhAκr = AhBκr < 0
We conclude that ∂h





Firing costs change the value function for Je to:
J
e = f(h) − w + β[(1 − λ)J
e − λφ]









−[(1 − β)θ(1 − β(1 − λ − p)) + (1 − θ)(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − β(1 − q))]κ
If the ﬁring cost is collected by the government and rebated to consumers, then





31In this case, the comparative statics is similar to the case of entry barrier with
rebating. Therefore, ∂h









[f(h) − λκ − λφ]
Comparative statics in this case are similar to the case of the entry barrier without
rebating. Therefore,∂h
∂φ > 0 and
∂ v
u
∂φ can not be determined.
(v) Per Period Regulatory Cost
Each production match must pay κr each period. This changes the value
function for a matched ﬁrm to:
J
e = f(h) − w − κr + β(1 − λ)J
e
Note that κr acts similar to a ﬁring cost if we set κr = βλφ. So, if the revenue
from this regulation is rebated, we have ∂h
∂κr > 0 and
∂ v
u
∂κr < 0. If the revenue from
this regulation is not rebated, we have ∂h
∂κr > 0 and
∂ v
u
∂κr is not determined.
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